Rev. Norman Jones‘ Biblically based article on “The Ethics of Nuclear War” in our December OUTLOOK suggested a number of questions about our nuclear defense concerning which there is a great deal of confusion. The subject is currently getting even more attention than usual because it is beginning to be discussed in new talks between representatives of the U.S. and Russia. The question about the placement of such weapons in space—“Star Wars” defense, as it has been called—is expected to be especially troublesome in these talks.

An Extraordinary Writer

In answer to an inquiry about dependable information on this subject the writings of Freeman Dyson were recommended as exceptionally knowledgeable and informative. Following this suggestion, I first read his earlier, 1979 book, Disturbing the Universe. Displaying a classically trained Englishman’s exceptional mastery of the language as well as a ready wit, it detailed the author’s experiences in the British army in World War II. In it he was assigned the duty of assessing the effectiveness of Britain’s strategic bombing of Germany. (His conclusion was that although the strategic bombing was extremely destructive, it was a failure as far as contributing to the outcome of the war was concerned just as were the German V2 rockets whose materials might better have been put into needed airplanes.) It was a curious fact that at that time the German girl who would Later become his wife was hiding in bomb shelters from the British bombs! Later he came to the United States and became involved with the leading scientists in the field in atomic weapons research. In general he came to support defensive weapon development, but to oppose offensive weapons. Although the earlier book is an illuminating and often highly entertaining introduction to the life and career of the author, his new 1984 volume, Weapons and Hope, addresses more directly the subject with which we are concerned.

The Aim: Communicating Between Two Worlds

“I write,” Dyson says, “because I live in two worlds, the world of the warriors and the world of the victims,” and he hopes to “improve mankind’s chances of escaping . . . nuclear holocaust if I can help these two worlds to understand and listen to each other” (p. 4) . He sees the warriors’ world in the scientists, technicians and military people with which he consults on technical problems. He sees the victims‘ world especially in the wives, children and families and in the churches which are often agitating for peace. While he hears the d ire predictions of some scientists of what would happen if war broke out, he also recalls how the actual casualties resulting from German bombing of London turned out to be only about one twentieth of the number which experts had predicted (p. 18). “We learned . . . that a war could still be fought and won without destroying civilization” and “that yielding to threats is the greater evil . . . .”

Trend Toward Smaller Weapons

An important fact which Dyson highlights (and which may not be generally known) is that the development of nuclear weaponry, instead of producing ever larger bombs, has been producing smaller ones. He sees this trend toward smaller weapons (in both the U.S. and Russia) as resulting from the Jack of targets for the earlier huge weapons, the improvement in accuracy, and the development of new delivery systems (cruise and MIRV missiles) which required keeping weapons as small (and relatively inexpensive) as possible. “The arms race has thus led to the paradoxical result that, at least as far as the United States forces are concerned, the hydrogen bomb has become almost irrelevant” (p. 38). “The same Strategic Air Command which clamored so loudly for the big bombs thirty years ago is now quietly withdrawing them from service.” In bombs as in nuclear power plants, the earlier “big units turned out to be inconvenient and uneconomical” (p. 39). Although “the two primary agents for abolishing nuclear weapons must be international negotiation and the aroused conscience of mankind,” “we will have a far better chance of achieving nuclear disarmament if the weapon s to be discarded are generally perceived to be not only immoral and dangerous but also obsolescent” (p. 41). “For those who are not yet convinced that nuclear weapons are more trouble than they are worth, the arms race itself may be a good teacher” (p. 43).

“David and Goliath”

In an especially intriguing chapter entitled “David and Goliath” the writer alludes to the Biblical story not for the religious lesson that it teaches, but as a “folk” story exemplifying a variety of ways in which monstrous offensive weapons may be destroyed by relatively small and simple defensive devices. “A successful David and Goliath experiment, with a two pound rocket killing an intercontinental missile . . . could mark the beginning of a change in the way people think about nuclear weapons, “showing them up as clumsy brutish things outwitted by a cheaper and more agile adversary” (p. 46).

A Computer Revolution

“The mathematician John von Neumann played a leading part in the development of nuclear weapons and an eve1 larger part in the development of computers. He said in 1946 when both these developments were just beginning, that the computers would be more important than the bombs. The impact which computers have made upon civilian society has already proved him right” (p. 51). Dyson sees new developments promising “to prove him right in the military sphere also,” as “small cheap devices with brains . . . overwhelm big expensive vehicles”—“David against Goliath.” Although some scientists might oppose scientific involvement in weaponry, “John von Neumann was the most brilliant and the most articulate of the scientists who consciously devoted their talents to the improvement of weaponry in the cause of freedom” (p. 53). “Freedom survived in England in 1940 because the technological Davids, the coastal radars and the fighter airplanes, were there when they were needed.” “For every scientist who believes with Einstein that modern weapons in the hands of modem governments are an absolute evil, there is another who believes with von Neumann that modern weapons rightly used can help David to survive in freedom in a world of Goliaths.”

Dyson cites the examples of some highly sophisticated and inviting weapons that turned out to be impractical and sometimes expensive failures and wonders whether the MX program might turn out to be the same. In a chapter entitled “Star Wars” he suggests that though space developments may have a modest role to play, “Space forces, like air forces, should be firmly harnessed to the strategic needs of earthbound humanity” (p. 72).

Sensible Shelters

Dyson was once invited to consult with Swiss officials on their very extensive shelter program. His conclusion was that their properly constructed shelters were, from a technical standpoint, remarkably effective and that such a system “has a good chance of making the difference between the life and the death of a society” (p. 91) and offers “a better chance of saving your life than any other weapon system which you could buy for the same money.” He sees such shelters, however as, in spite of their merits, practically unacceptable to the American public because of their expense and politically inexpedient because our building them would be interpreted as preparing for a nuclear attack on others.

Facing U.S.—Soviet Differences of Strategy

A central part of the book deals with the experiences and points of view of a wide variety of individuals and groups of people such as soldiers, scientists and diplomats in the complex subject of war strategy. Dyson sees both U.S. and Russian current dependence on nuclear weaponry as a mistake. He cites U.S. Lieutenant General Arthur Collins’ opinion that “If we try to defend Europe with nuclear weapons . . . we are playing a game which the Soviet Union knows how to win” (p. 161). He thinks that “a non-nuclear defense of NATO territory is feasible and affordable. Only the addiction of our military and political leaders to nuclear weapons deprived us of all incentive to build a defense system that would really work” (p. 162). While “World War I was the classic example of a war of stupor and mass destruction,” “the early blitzkrieg campaigns of Hitler were amazingly nondestructive compared with the campaigns ofWorld War I.” “The technological arms race . . . is moving away from mass destruction toward weapons which give scope to brains and initiative.”

Our dealing with the Russians has been complicated by differences of history and viewpoint. While we think of deterrence from war by weapons development (“assured destruction”), they envision survival and ultimate victory if war should come. While the Soviet strategy, reflecting Russia’s past history as dramatized in Tolstoy’s monumental War and Peace, has been based on development of a “counterforce” adequate to meet and overcome any attack, that of the U.S. for thirty years has stressed building weapons for “assured destruction” and (somewhat contradictorily) for a “limited nuclear war” (p. 291). These U.S. concepts, Dy son rejects, “assured destruction because it is immoral and suicidal, limited nuclear war because it is illusory, and both of them because they are incompatible with Soviet concepts and, therefore, incompatible with comprehensive arms control agreements.” The author’s own conclusion is bluntly stated. “If I were running the United States as an absolute monarch, I would choose non-nuclear resistance as my policy. It is risky, it is hopeful, and in my heart I know that it is right. I would accept the risks of leaving the Soviet Union as the only major nuclear power in the world. Fortunately , I am not an absolute monarch and do not have to take this responsibility” (p. 292). Short of that, he would advocate a policy of “live and let live.”

Conclusion: What Ground for Hope?

In a final chapter, “Tragedy is Not Our Business,” Mr. Dyson, somewhat as in his earlier book, leaves the technical and political fields behind and takes refuge in past history and literature. He quotes extensively from Governor William Bradford’s history of the early Plymouth colony and, after a number of other such literary digressions, returns to Bradford with the remark, “Many of us do not share Bradford’s religious belief, but we can all share his pride and his hope. Pride for what the old people have done, hope for what the young people will do. The most important lesson which comedy has to teach us is never to give up hope.”

This extraordinarily well-written book sheds far more light than this review can detail on the technical problems and complexities of national defense in today’s world. Whether or not one agrees with the author’s conclusions, it is a good book to read to become better informed on the subject. He tries to give a balanced treatment of the controversial questions involved. He also makes it plain that his basic perspective does not depend ultimately on technology but on his faith. Unfortunately that is avowedly not the Christian faith, but a secular faith which appears remarkably akin to the humanistic wishful speculation of the (liberal) Protestant and Catholic clerics with whom he evidently associates himself in their peace movement. This faith is not ours, and neither should its perspective be ours.

As a study of weaponry, Mr. Dyson’s book is very informative, but as an assurance of hope (the other half of his title) it is really without substance or ground. The real bankruptcy of the hope becomes pathetically apparent when he in his conclusion recommends adopting William Bradford’s confidence while explicitly rejecting the faith in God which was its only ground! Something similar happens in his treatment of Old Testament history. His clever adaptation of the David and Goliath story, using it as a bit of folklore to illustrate the historical development of weaponry, apt as it is, quite ignores the point David wanted to make absolutely clear. “You come against me with sword and spear and javelin, but I come against you in the name of the LORD Almighty . . . whom you have defied . . . . This day the LORD will hand you over to me . . . .” “All those gathered here will know that it is not by sword or spear that the LORD saves, for the battle is the LORD‘S, and He will give all of you into our hands” (I Sam. 17:45–47). With such a faith in God, we, like Bradford, must have fewer illusions than Mr. Dyson does about the good will of men, the Soviets, in particular. (One is inclined to agree with his comment that he “fortunately” does not have to make the final decision whether to trust them.) Our Christian hope is not a bit of folklore useful on occasion to embellish a secularist’s hopeful dreams. It is a hope “both su re and steadfast” (Heb. 6: 19), anchored in Christ who claimed, “All authority has been given to me in heaven and on earth,” and “Heaven and earth will pass away, but My words shall not pass away” (Matt. 28:18; 24:35). While His word instructs us, “If possible, so far as it depends on you, be at peace with all men” (Rom. 12:18), it goes on immediately to add that we must obey and support governments in their responsible use of weapons to suppress evil (13:1–7; cf. Matt. 22:21). Yet our hope is not to be in those governments or their weapons, but in Him who has complete authority over them.

Note: Freeman Dyson’s Weapons and Hope is published by Harper and Row, New Yorlc, priced at $17.95. His earlier book, Disturbing the Universe, is now also available in a relatively inexpensive ($5.95) paperback.