Rev. Jelle Tuininga is pastor of the Christian Reformed Church of Smithers, British Columbia. He served as a delegate from Classis British Columbia at the 1976 CRC Synod. His article on “Divorce and Remarriage in the CRC” is being presented in two installments, the second scheduled for next month.

History – Up till the present, the stand of the CRC has been that adultery constitutes the only legitimate, “biblical ground” for divorce. Prior to 1956 it was also held that persons who were divorced on unbiblical grounds and who were subsequently remarried, were living in a state of continual adultery, and in order to demonstrate genuine repentance would have to break this second, “adulterous” relationship and return to their first partners. Synod of ’56 came to the conclusion that “no substantial and conclusive Scriptural evidence” was available to show that such persons were “living in continual adultery” and should, therefore, cease living with their present spouses and return to their original partners “in order to prove the sincerity of their repentance” (Acts ‘56, p. 59).

I believe Synod was right in making this decision. Sinful as the original act of divorce was, and sinful as the subsequent act of remarriage was, I don’t think the Scriptures demand that this latter marriage (or marriages, in cases where both partners have remarried) must again be broken or dissolved in order to show genuine repentance. Murray comments in this connection that “it must at least be said that the first remarriage was adulterous and had the effect of dissolving both marriages (in a case where two couples arc involved, J.T.). The second pair of marriages are to be regarded as the only ones that are de facto existent. It would only aggravate the guilt of all concerned to try to remedy the situation by the method proposed” (namely, that they all resume their first marital relationships) (Divorce, p. 114 ).

   

However, by making this decision, Synod in no wise justified such divorces and remarriages, as though the church could lend its blessing to such actions. And that is now what the 1976 Report would have Synod declare that the blessing of the church be extended to a remarriage also where it involves “the so-called innocent person in a divorce granted on grounds other than unchastity and who had sincerely sought reconciliation in attempting to preserve the former marriage.” The same blessing would also extend to “the so-called guilty party in a divorce (including divorces on grounds other than biblical, J.T.) who has manifested genuine repentance . . .” (Acts ‘76, p.486).

Divorce – It is clear that the proposals of the study committee report would involve quite a change from our previously held position. Till now the church gave its blessing for remarriage only to the “innocent party” in a divorce on “biblical grounds.” Under the proposed rules, the “guilty” party in such a divorce would also be able to remarry with the blessing of the church. And what is more, this would even be the case where the divorce took place on non–biblical grounds.

If now this proposed change was clearly based on Scripture, or even if it could be reasonably deduced from Scripture (as e.g. the change made in ‘56), then I would be ready to accept it. But the Report has not only failed to convince me of this; I find its exegesis very weak and its deductions far-fetched.

I should point out that the Report contains much that is worthwhile. It makes some very valuable contributions to our understanding of the problems surrounding marriage and divorce. Especially the first part of the Report is very good. The authors also have a point when they say that in a marriage break. down there is really no “innocent” party. It takes two to fight, and two are usually to blame for the ensuing divorce also. That’s why I used quotation marks around the adjectives “innocent” and “guilty” above. Nevertheless, it seems to me, we will have to retain the concept in some form or another if we are to take Jesus’ exceptive clause (“except it be for adultery”) seriously. There is something about the act of adultery (sexual infidelity) on the part of one of the marriage partners that really strikes at the very heart of marriage. The Report itself recognizes this:

Implicit in this view is the basic importance of the physical act of sex in marriage as the highest symbolic act in regard to the meaning of marriage. Physical union in sexual activity becomes the central symbol of two people becoming one flesh. In that sense, physical fidelity to the marriage partner has a unique status among all the “faithful acts” in a marriage. Physical union brings all of the rcst into focus as the most full and free expression of love and fidelity . . . .

Physical infidelity symbolizes the epitome of unfaithfulness and strikes at the very heart and center of the marriage relationship. As the supreme oct of infidelity it may be evidence for the fact that the marriage breakdown is so complete that the restoration of that marriage relationship becomes impossible (p. 475). I believe this is exactly what the Bible means by the “one flesh” relationship in marriage (cf. e.g., I Cor. 6:15–17), and because adultery strikes right at the heart of that “one flesh” relationship, it stands in a class all by itself as regards marital unfaithfulness, and I believe this is what Jesus is referring to in the exceptive clause. To be sure, there may be, and often are, extenuating circumstances in the marriage relationship which are conducive to adultery or at least open the door to its possibility, but that in no way diminishes the gravity of such an adulterous act. Both parties may, and often do, have a share of the guilt involved in such a breakdown, but nevertheless the act of physical infidelity alone constitutes a radical break of the “one flesh” relationship in marriage. And in that context the church has traditionally spoken of an “innocent” party. Not unjustly, it seems to me.

Now to say that this exceptive clause is not an exception, but that it stands for marriage breakdown in general; to say that “adultery” covers “all the ways in which infidelity in marriage can take place” (as the 1973 Report did, Cf. Acts ‘73, p. 598). not only reduces the force of Jesus‘ words entirely, and fails moreover to appreciate the unique “one flesh” relationship of marriage, but it is also patent nonsense. It really makes Jesus say: Divorce is wrong except when your marriage breaks down (for whatever possible or impossible reason). It‘s like saying: Marriage is permanent except when it won’t work. Or: Marriage is permanent except when it isn’t; divorce is wrong except when it’s right.

Such argumentation makes a farce out of Jesus‘ words. If that’s what Jesus meant He would have said so, and there would be no need to add the exceptive clause. Because then there are no exceptions: then burning the potatoes or failing to balance the budget also suffice as reasons for divorce. But Jesus is saying that marriage is for life; it is indissoluble; what God has joined together, let not man put asunder. That’s the divine rule. And the only possible exception to that is when adultery breaks apart that most intimate one-flesh relationship. That and that alone strikes at the very core and center of marriage.

I spoke of a “possible exception.” We used to speak of “biblical grounds for divorce.” The 1976 Report calls it a “possible permissible ground for divorce.” There are those who take exception to both phrases. They say there are no “grounds” for divorce. Perhaps they have a point. Ideally, marriage is per· manent. That’s the way God made it in the beginning: the man shall cleave unto his wife and the two shall become one flesh; and what God has joined together, let no man put asunder. It‘s only because of sin that the ideal is not always reached. Notwithstanding this, one has to take seriously the exceptive clause in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9, and then I see no great obstacle in the way of speaking of a legitimate biblical ground for divorce, provided it is correctly understood. It is well to keep in mind what Murray says in this connection:

What is of paramount importance is that however significant is the exceptive clause as guarding the innocence of the husband in dismissing for sexual infidelity, it is not the exceptive clause that bears the weight of the emphasis in the text. It is rather that the husband may not put away for any other cause. It is the one exception that gives prominence to the illegitimacy of any other reason. Pre-occupation with the one exception should never be permitted to obscure the force of the negation of all others (p. 21).

Even though adultery has often been used as an “escape hatch” to get the court to sanction a divorce (sometimes it is even “invented” in order to end an undesirable relationship), this in no way relaxes the biblical concept of it. Misuse does not annul proper use. It is somewhat ironical that though both the 1973 and 1976 Reports hesitate to speak of “grounds” for divorce, in practice they are recommending all kinds of “grounds” (causes) for divorce, besides adultery.

The 1976 Report, in contrast to that of 1973, wants to restrict “porneia” to adultery. “Thus there is much in favor of, and nothing against, understanding the primary reference of porneia in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 to be ‘adultery,’ that is, sexual infidelity on the part of one of the marriage partners.” Again: “If our interpretation of the sense of the exceptive clauses in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 is correct, then physical infidelity, precisely because it is unique and symbolizes the epitome of unfaithfulness, may be reckoned as a permissible ground for divorce. We argued that it was so regarded because physical sexual union symbolizes the quintessence of the marriage union.” It is therefore the more surprising and strange to have these authors go on to say:

There may, however, be other kinds of actions, situations, and conditions that in the judgment of a consistory can only be judged to be the equivalent of unrepentant unchastity in signaling the complete breakdown of a marriage and the unlikelihood of its restoration. Exactly what actions, circumstances, and situations would qualify for being the equivalent of unrepentant adultery would be difficult to say . . . . Certainly in the case of willful (prolonged and unrepentant) desertion, any kind of meaningful marriage relationship is impossible. It is conceivable that other actions, circumstances, and situations could likewise be judged to be the equivalent of prolonged and unrepentant unchastity. In such cases then, also, divorce might be recognized as the only valuable course of action (p. 476).

That seems to me to be a big (and illegitimate) jump from “physical infidelity” which “symbolizes the epitome of unfaithfulness and strikes at the very heart and center of the marriage relationship.” I can see consistory members pulling their hair out trying to determine what exactly those “actions, situations, and conditions” are that can “be judged to be the equivalent of unrepentant unchastity.” Is it even the task of the consistory to judge this, and may they ever give their consent or approval to such actions? I think not, and it seems to me the committee is treading here on dangerous ground, and opening a pandora’s box of evils.

It may legitimately be asked, it seems to me, if one single act of adultery constitutes what Jesus is referring to in the exceptive clause, but to go to the other extreme and speak about the “equivalent” of unchastity is something else. And it should be said, of course (if it needs saying) that Christians should not see adultery either as an excuse for divorce, nor as a basis for the necessity of it. Even in the face of adultery, Christians should be ready to forgive and seek reconciliation.

As far then as the teaching of our Lord in the gospels is concerned, I can agree with the author who says:

The teaching of our Lord . . . is that a man may divorce his wife on the ground of her adultery. Fornication (all kinds of illicit sexual intercourse, for the married person this amounts to adultery) is unequivocally stated by Jesus Christ to be the only legitimate ground for which a man may put away his wife. . . . Notice that (it) does not say a man has to put away his wife—he is not under obligation to do so, but it does say that adultery is the only reason for which he may put her away. . . .

The man who divorces his wife on improper unbiblical grounds commits adultery and causes his new wife to enter into adultery, when he remarries. Thus this man is not free to marry again any more than his improperly divorced wife as Matthew 5:32 indicated also. For, in reality, before the sight of God he is still the husband of his divorced wife. The illegitimate divorce has not dissolved the original marriage. For this man to remarry then would be an act of adultery. But the man who divorces his wife on the proper ground of adultery does not himself commit adultery when he remarries. Divorce on this Biblical ground affords to the innocent spouse the right and liberty to remarry.

(Ken J. Campbell in Trowel & Sword, Dec. ‘73)

This has been the position of our church up till now, and I believe it is the only legitimate interpretation of the various passages in the gospels (Matt. 5:32; 19:9; Mark 10:2–12; Luke 16:18). It may seem unduly harsh in our permissive age, and we may grumble with it, but before we change our stand it must be shown conclusively on the basis of biblical evidence that our previous stand was wrong. Neither the 1973 nor the 1976 Report has done that in any satisfactory way, it appears to me. I believe one of my colleagues had a point when he said: “We simply don‘t like what it says, and that’s why we try to change it.” Everyone knows that in practical life, also in the CRC, the guidelines of our church are often violated. Several unbiblical divorces and remarriages take place. But let’s not try to justify that by committing another error—that of trying to change our stand to accommodate the facts. Rather, let’s change the facts to fit the stand.

And in the practical exigencies of life, when we arc sometimes faced with tremendously difficult and complicated cases, we do well to remember what Rev. Elenbaas wrote in The Banner (June 4, ‘76):

These arc the cases where our commitment to the transforming power of God’s grace will be proved by fire. “Incompatible,” “irreconcilable differences,” “dead marriage,” “no reasonable hopes,” are terms that don’t even belong in the vocabulary of those who believe that “with God all things are possible” (Matt. 19:26). [and don‘t forget that the disciples here were “exceedingly astonished, above measure” at the words of Jesus!, J.T.] We betray a very humanistic view if we use these words from secular courts to deny that the Holy Spirit can bring about in either or both of the former partners the kind of character change needed to restore the broken marriage.

(To be continued)