Does God Tell Untruths?

Does God at times tell us things which are not true? Has some of the Biblical material been adapted perhaps for teaching purposes—to suit the limited understanding of man? In his recent book, Reason Within the Bounds of Religion, Nicholas Wolterstorff, professor of philosophy at Calvin College, suggests that this may be the case:

“Frequently in teaching children one tells them what is, strictly speaking, false. So also it may be that some of what God says is, strictly speaking, false, accommodated to our frailty . . .” (p.113).

“Some of what God wishes us to believe may be fit and proper for us as his ‘children’ to believe, yet strictly speaking false” (p. 95).

   

A Long History

The notion that matters in Scripture have been modified to accommodate our limited human understanding has a long history. The great Church Father Augustine (354–430 A.D.), for example, applied this concept to the creation account. Augustine was, unfortunately, heavily influenced by the prominent secular philosophers Plato (427–347 B.C.) and Plotinus (204–270 A.D.) who affirmed that the creative act could not have occurred in time. Thus Augustine held that the entire universe was created instantaneously with time. As a result, Augustine rejected the traditional reading of Genesis and sought allegorical interpretations . Throughout his life he advanced several alternate interpretations of the Genesis “days.” In his “Literal Commentary on Genesis” Augustine proposed that the creation of light refers to the creation of the angels and that the six days represent the successive phases of knowledge that the angels acquire of God’s creation.

However, it is noteworthy that Augustine did not doubt that the traditional, literal day interpretation was in fact the intended one. Rather, he suggested that the creation story was told in the Biblical form primarily for the benefit of those who would not be able to comprehend the true account.

More recently, a similar stance has been taken by Herman Dooyeweerd and some of his followers. Due to his conception of time, Dooyeweerd emphatically rejected the traditional interpretation of the Genesis creation account as a series of chronological events. He goes so far as to say that “blasphemy presents itself if God’s creative acts are conceived in natural time concepts” (Dooyeweerd, In The Twilight of Western Thought, p. 150).

To the obvious objection that the creation account itself already speaks rather clearly about a series of temporal events, Harry Diemer, a follower of Dooyeweerd, echoes the response of Augustine. He argues that the human mind functions in time and can therefore understand the creative act only if it is laid out in a number of acts, each consisting of a time period: in the creation account the announcement of the order is suited to the needs of human understanding (Diemer, Natuur en Wonder, p. 16). Thus Diemer, too, invokes the theory of accommodation. Diemer’s concession that the traditional view is the int ended interpretation is somewhat amusing in view of the fact that this is precisely the interpretation which the master, Dooyeweerd, dismissed as “blasphemous!”

But if the human mind can comprehend creation only as a series of temporal acts, how can Diemer even conceive of creation being otherwise? Are Dooyeweerd and Augustine super-thinkers who alone can grasp what eludes the lesser mortals? It seems—to me, at any ratethat an instantaneous creation would be no less difficult to comprehend. Indeed, if there is at all any validity to the objections to the traditional reading of Genesis, it would seem that an instantaneous creation would be easier to understand. But why, then, did God not tell us the true story?

It appears that Augustine and Dooyeweerd prefer their own philosophical notions of time to the intended interpretation of Scripture. Would it not be better for them to consider such conflicts with Scripture as indications of the inadequacy of their theorizing, and to consequently seek appropriate modifications which would bring their theorizing in line with Scripture? We must evaluate Dooyeweerd’s cosmonomic speculations in the light of Scripture rather than vice-versa.

Calvin’s Interpretations

Much of the current popularity of the accommodation theory can be traced to the influence of none other than John Calvin (1509–1564). How did this arise? In Calvin’s day there was as yet little tension between science and Scripture. There has been considerable debate as to whether Calvin was pre-, pro-, or anti-Copernican. However, until the end of the 16th century the ideas of Copernicus were taken seriously by very few scientists. Copernicanism was simply not an issue in Calvin’s day.

Nevertheless, Calvin did discern a few minor problems. For example, in Genesis 1:16 the moon is referred to as a “great light” but astronomers in Calvin’s day had calculated that Saturn is intrinsically brighter. Calvin solved this difficulty by formulating his principle of accommodation. He postulated that, with reference to celestial phenomena,

“God speaks to us about things according to what we perceive them to be, not according to what they are.” (Commentary on Genesis 1:16)

The Biblical authors are thus thought to speak of the heavenly bodies solely with respect to their visual appearance. Calvin advocated that Moses had adapted his writing to common usage so that all could understand the message; the uneducated were without excuse that the message was beyond their power of comprehension.

Now, up to a point, this seems reasonable enough. Certainly with respect to the moon being designated a “great light,” it is clear from the context of Gen. 1:16 that this is with reference to the earth; the sun and moon were after all created primarily to provide light for the earth. Throughout Scripture the earth is taken as the reference point with respect to which all positions and motions are measured. Thus the Bible writer refers to the RELATIVE brightness of the moon as seen from the earth; he makes no reference to the ABSOLUTE brightness of the moon compared to the planets or stars. Hence there can be no objection if the astronomers claim the absolute brightness of, say, Saturn to be greater than that of the moon.

Calvin’s application of accommodation appears innocent enough. However, by limiting the Biblical statements on celestial events to only visual appearances Calvin implied that science had a deeper grasp on physical reality. According to Pierre Marcel, in a recent article in Philosophical Reformata:

“It was scientific rather than theological reasons which governed the announcement of this principle: the apprehension of actual astronomical facts.” (Jan. 1981, p. 32)

Although Calvin may have been fairly moderate in his application of the accommodation theory, others expanded considerably on this theme. Calvin’s accommodation theory had a substantial influence on the 17th century Copernican astronomers since it permitted them to conveniently disregard those texts which appeared to refer to the motion of the sun. As a result, Kepler and Galilee, among others, took the Bible to be authoritative only in matters of faith and morals, and not in questions of science. The Puritan clergyman and scientist John Wilkins (1614–72), for example, explicitly referred to Calvin in support of his non-literalist interpretation of Scripture when touching on scientific matters. In more recent times, liberal theologians insist that a great deal of Scripture has been adapted to suit the naive world-view of ancient man. Thus the famous neo-orthodox theologian Rudolph Bultmann goes so far as to consider even the cross and the resurrection as mere accommodation to a prescientific people.

Now, it is one thing to grant science the privilege of explaining some of the (non-miraculous) Bible phenomena. But may we permit it also to question the reliability of the Biblical account? Would Calvin, too, have modified his view on the historicity of Biblical events if he had lived in the present evolutionistic age? Marcel appears to picture Calvin as a forerunner of the neo-orthodox school:

“. . . Calvin, by a stroke of genius, liberated theology from every scientific judgment external to itself and science from any enslavement to theology: thereby he reconciled theologians and astronomers . . .” (p. 32).

“Where the principle of accommodation is not honoured today exegesis loses itself in insoluble antinomies or in false harmonization” (p. 35).

Yet Marcel’s assessment of Calvin’s accommodation theory is surely too radical: on the basis of Calvin’s otherwise high view of Scripture (see, for example, John Murray’s book, Calvin on Scripture and Divine Authority), I find it doubtful that he would have extended his principle much further. But where does one draw the line? It is clear that, in the absence of explicit, Scripturally valid bounds, the subjective application of accommodation can readily lead to a gross distortion of God’s Word.

Objections to the Accommodation Theory

Not surprisingly, there have always been others who became alarmed at the potential excesses of the accommodation theory. Thus, for example, Gisbert Voet (1589–1676), one of the leading Dutch theologians of the 17th century, rejected the opinion that the teachings of Scripture were limited to matters of faith and ethics:

“Holy Scripture teaches not only what is necessary to salvation, but also lays down . . . the principles of all other good sciences and arts” (as quoted by R. Hooykaas in “Religion and the Rise of Modern Science,” p. 130).

He believed that if the Holy Ghost were to accommodate Himself to the common people, He would tell a lie on behalf of the common people. Thus he opposed as much as possible the sort of reasoning evident in Calvin’s accommodation theory (cf. Hooykaas, p. 131).

The Lutheran Abraham Calovius, writing in the middle of the 17th century, already feared that the theory that Biblical passages had been adapted to common ways of thinking would be a hole in the dyke which would grow to the point of destroying the dyke itself. Hence Calovius held that no error, even in seemingly unimportant matters, could have any place in Scripture.

It is to be noted that the point of issue is not whether Scriptural knowledge is incomplete. Scripture itself indicated that at present “we see in a mirror dimly . . . now I know in part; then I shall understand fully” (I Cor. 13: 12). Rather, the question is whether that knowledge, limited as it is, is nevertheless true. The accommodation theory suggests that some scriptural information is, strictly speaking false, but that it thereby serves to illustrate some higher truth. It implies that God has deliberately distorted His Word, albeit for teaching purposes.

This theory may appear to be an attractive means of avoiding various problems of interpretation involving apparent inaccuracies in details. After all, the details may seem to be hardly pertinent to the central message. However, once we consider the Bible to be untrustworthy in its details, why should we unquestioningly accept the apparently more major teachings? How can we distinguish accommodation from the true message? Is it not well possible that the account of the resurrection is also, strictly speaking, false and that it is merely a symbol for a deeper religious truth? Nowadays we encounter many vague applications of the theory of accommodation but they are justified by no clear, Biblical criteria as to their validity and extent. Without such essential guidelines it is clear that the dangerous excesses of accommodation can be avoided only by rejecting the concept completely.

Furthermore, the Bible itself gives us no indication that God sometimes says something which is, strictly speaking, false. On the contrary, God is always portrayed as a God of truth: “thy word is truth” (Ps. 119:160); “. . . God, who never lies . . .” (Titus 1:2; etc.). On the other hand, God does permit Satan to perform signs and wonders in order to test our faith (Deut. 13:3) and to deceive those who refuse to love the truth (II Thes. 2:9–12); and the truth of the gospel is distorted by false prophets (II Peter 2:1–3). We are warned not to be led astray by “philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition . . . and not according to Christ” (Col. 2:8) and of “the contradictions of what is falsely called knowledge” (I Tim. 6:20). It seems clear, then, that we are to accept the truth of God‘s word and that we must test the spirits against this Word.

There is something presumptuous, or even arrogant, about the theory of accommodation. For in its application we are really saying “yes, the Bible may say that . . . but we know better.” Discussions of the untrustworthiness of Scripture are meaningful only in the presence of a higher standard of truth. Thus the application of the accommodation theory implies the existence of a higher source of truth-scientific theorizing or philosophical speculation—which enables us to detect where the Scriptural teaching is not quite true. But in such applications it is really man who accommodates Scripture to his own way of thinking.

Again, I stress that when accommodation is invoked to explain some apparently trivial matter in Scripture I am concerned, not so much about the actual minor point in question , but much more about the principle involved. The central thesis—that God may sometimes tell us something which is, strictly speaking, false-is contrary to Scripture. And hence it must be rejected. We must hold firm to the Reformational foundation of “Sola Scriptura” and strive to make all our thoughts captive to Christ a nd subjected to His Word. 

Note: John Byl is associate Professor of Mathematics at Trinity Western College at Langley, British Columbia.