G.C. Berkouwer: Divine Election (Studies in Dogmatics). Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1960, $4.50.

In the perspective of historical theology and in the context of present-day debate no undertaking could place greater demands upon the theologian than a monograph on the subject of divine election. And no theologian within the Reformed tradition excels G. C. Berkouwer in the extensive and mature scholarship necessary for such a task. This is not a book to be read at one sitting nor is its argument one to be grasped. on one reading. Review is, therefore, more than arduous.

The difficulty just mentioned does not arise from obscurity in Berkouwer’s style of writing. It proceeds rather from the complexity of the issues involved, a complexity not always attaching to the mystery of God’s counsel but to the aberrations of human thought by which the doctrine has been perplexed and distorted. As a contribution to historical as well as to systematic theology, Berkouwer brings the various facets and currents of thought within his purview. No book on this topic surpasses Berkouwer’s in respect of erudition, information, and challenge.

It may not be amiss to suggest that the lay reader should read first of all chapters I, IX, and X. In these chapters the practical and devotional significance of the doctrine of election is brought into focus, and this is particularly true of chapter IX where “Election and the Certainty of Salvation” is dealt with in admirable fashion. From the beginning of the volume this is the question that Berkouwer poses and it is never far from his interest. At the outset his thesis is: “In Scripture the certainty of salvation is never threatened or cast in shadows because of the fact of election. Rather, we always read of the joy of God’s election and of election as the profound, unassailable and strong foundation for man’s salvation, both for time and for eternity” (p. 13). In chapter IX this thesis is vindicated. Here a good deal of space is devoted to the question of the syllogismus practicus, to the misinterpretations against which it must be guarded but particularly to its validity and its consistency with the principle of sofa rule when it is properly understood as the syllogism of faith. And this means that “only in the way of sanctification man can be, and remain, certain of his election” (p. 302). “It is not a connection in which sanctification becomes a compensation whereby man—as a last resort—may deduce his personal election from ills sanctification. It is, rather, a connection which originates from the revelation and the reality of election itself” (p. 306). It would have been helpful if some attention had been given in this same discussion to the exposition of Romans 8:16 and to the indispensable complementation of the fruit of the Spirit and the inward witness of the Spirit in the certainty of salvation (cf. p. 301).

In chapter II Berkouwer deals with what in historical perspective has been the crux of debate and division. It is the question: “Where falls the decision of man’s redemption?” (p. 28). The whole matter of synthesis “in which both God’s grace and man’s decision were given a full place” (p. 29) and that of prescience as conditioning God’s election is thoroughly dealt with. Romish, Remonstrant, and Lutheran positions are analyzed and the author concludes: “In no form of synergism is it possible to escape the conclusion that man owes his salvation not solely to God but also to himself” (p. 42). Synergism “is encountered nowhere in Scripture. For if anything is clear in Scripture. it is that it nowhere presents a human-divine complementary relationship” (p. 44 ). And, in interpreting Philippians 2:12, 13, a text to which appeal had often been made in the polemics of history, Berkouwer shows that here we do not have “the idea of a complementary relationship and of cooperation” (p. 45). The human activity is the result of the divine, is created and called forth by the divine; man’s act thus receives “such a form that the nature of his act excludes cooperation” (p. 46).

The necessity of distinguishing between arbitrariness, on the one hand, and the freedom and sovereignty of election, on the other, always rests upon the exponent of the latter. This duty Berkouwer does not evade. One of the difficulties here resides in the use of the term “arbitrary” in human affairs. The man who is arbitrary is the man who acts “without taking into account any norm or law above himself” (p. 54). Does this mean, therefore, that since God is not arbitrary he must always act in terms of a law or norm above himself? This is the whole question of the meaning of exlex as applied to God. Various positions are passed under review. Of particular interest is the explanation of Calvin’s opposition to the idea of God as exfex as also to the fiction of potentia absoillta (pp. 56 ff.). Berkouwer’s own treatment of the question from the biblical point of view (pp. 80 ff.) is eminently valuable.

Much theological discussion has been concerned with the distinction between the secret will of God and the revealed. And closely related to this distinction is the question how, if election belongs to the secret will of God, may we ever attain to the knowledge of our own election? These and related questions are explored in chapter IV. Calvin’s concept of Christ as “the mirror of election,” and Luther’s of Christ as “the Book of Life” are adduced to show that in the Protestant tradition as opposed to the Romish there is propounded the thesis of “the knowability, the revelation, of election” (p.110) so that the certainty of our election is not derived from any special revelation to the individual nor from curious prying into the secret counsel of God but from the revelation in Christ as received by faith. With respect to the distinction between the secret and revealed will, Berkouwer rightly warns against the tendency to construe the revealed will as “unactual.” When we do this, then “the will of God in law and gospel is overshadowed and even threatened” by what is supposed to be the only actual will of God, namely, his secret will (p. 117). “Scripture…forbids identification of the will of the ordinance with unactuality” (p. 118).

One of the most difficult questions pertaining to election is the interpretation of Ephesians 1:4 and related texts (cf. II Tim. 1:9). It is the question of the relation which Christ sustains to election on the part of God the Father. Berkouwer devotes much illuminating attention to the subject. The discussion is to a considerable extent centered on the question whether Christ should be called the foundation or origin of man’s salvation or merely the executor of election (cf. p. 134). We should expect that the Remonstrant view whereby Christ was conceived of as the foundation and cause of election, because election was motivated by Christ’s act, and Christ “‘as Mediator is the causa impulsiva, movens, meritoria of the decree of election’” (p. 136) would be rejected. Such a view “flagrantly contradicts Scripture” (idem). On the other hand, it is not sufficient to think of Christ as no more than the executor. Scripture “speaks not of mere execution but of election in Christ” (p. 137). With the rejection of a false dilemma Berkouwer proceeds with the review of theological discussion, shows that the Reformed rejection of the Remonstrant position did not mean that the notion of “foundation,” when properly understood and clarified, was per se unacceptable, exposes the fallacy of J. K. S. Reid’s criticism of Calvin, and effectively defends the latter against any such monstrous charge as that election precedes grace (cf. pp. 137 ff.). Berkouwer gives adequate space to the question whether “in Christ” could be regarded as referring to Christ’s participation in election in the eternal counsel, the view propounded by Gomarus (cf. pp. 143 ff.).

The discllssion of the pactum salutis (pp. 162 ff.) is of particular interest. The author raises some pertinent questions. He is appreciative of the purpose served by this construction, namely, that it was “employed especially to oppose the idea that election was decreed completely apart from Christ, and that he was nothing but the executor of that decree” (p. 162). But when the idea of “covenant” is introduced, one comes to entertain suspicion respecting the propriety of such a formulation. And so Berkouwer asks: “Is it possible to furnish Biblical evidence for such a pactum as a real ‘covenant’? Does not a pact always presuppose an ‘over against,’ as in the covenant between God and man?” (idem). Bavinck considered that the doctrine was based on “a Scriptural concept” but nevertheless thought that the formulation was not free from “scholastic subtleness” and that “many irrelevant references” have been quoted in its support (pp. 162f.). Berkouwer defends the doctrine insofar as it indicated the “depth-aspect” of salvation, that “eternity does not stand in contrast to what in time becomes historical reality, but rather that the salvation accomplished…has its eternal foundation in the love of God.” This is not to “humanize the counsel of God” but “to indicate an analogy between what is called a ‘covenant’ or ‘pact’ on earth” (p. 168). However. in the reviewer’s judgment, covenant in Scripture always refers to historical administration and it is a deviation from biblical usage to construct the relations which the persons of the Godhead sustained to one another in the counsels of eternity in terms of covenant. The doctrine of the pactum is not thus bereft of any of its significance but it is given a more biblico-theological orientation.

In this chapter one misses a discussion of the correlation that exists between Ephesians 1:4 and Romans 8:29 (cf. p. 151). It would not be feasible to regard predestination to be conformed to the image of God’s Son that he might be the firstborn among many brethren as embracing all that is implied in election in Christ. But this is surely a factor that must be given full account in the exegesis of Ephesians 1:4 and particularly when we note that chosen in Christ (Eph. 1:4) and “in love predestinated” (Eph. 1:5) are most properly taken as parallel to and epexegetical of one another.

I must confess to embarrassment when I read with reference to Ephesians 1:4 the endorsement of Van Leeuwen’s remark that “‘the counsel of God is not an immutable and fixed decree,’” and then Berkouwer adds: “This fixedness and immutability are foreign to Paul’s hymn on the love of God. The power and evidence of Paul’s testimony have safeguarded the Church and theology at decisive moments against a devaluation of God’s election to such a fixedness of decree, which is only later realized in the work of Christ” (p. 149). One is at a loss to understand how the fixedness of the decree could be a devaluation of God’s election or how the historical realization of what had been decreed should be prejudicial to the immutability of the decree. Later on Berkouwer repeatedly speaks of the immutability of God’s plan when he speaks of “the foundation of salvation in God’s plan as immutable reality” (p. 150) and says that “the immutability of God’s work is based on this plan, which will reach its goal in spite of dangers and weaknesses” (p. 151 ). Again, “one may not limit the divine sovereignty or violate the immutability of the counsel of God” (p. 153). The fair construction would be that what Berkouwer is aiming at in the statements quoted from page 149 is the conception of the decree as “abstract act” or as “purely formal decree” apart from Christ and detached from those connections which the Scripture itself establishes (cf· p. 153). Of course, the decree of election is never thus abstract or detached. But the statements in question (p. 149) are, to say the least, infelicitous and misleading as a way of guarding election from the abstraction which Scripture does not permit (cf. p. 161). It is without any dissent that we accede to the following: “God’s election is election in Christ. ‘Not because of works, but because of grace: In this way the tension between sovereignty and grace, which so often became manifest in the thinking of many people, will disappear. For this grace is truly sovereign, and this sovereignty is no longer a hidden menace (the arbitrariness!) which obscures grace. The election of God in Christ is not a violation of the way of salvation, but its proclamation” (p.162).

As we might expect, the most acute questions arise in connection with election and reprobation (chapter VI ). Berkouwer is insistent throughout on the sovereignty of election and the sovereignty of grace in election. This is, indeed, the refrain from start to finish. He will give no quarter to the notion of praescientia or praevisa fides as the conditioning element in election, explanatory of the differentiation which election involves. “The essential thing in faith as a gift of God is that it is based on this truly monopleuristic act in the election of God. Faith in its ‘instrumental’ character knows only of this one and sufficient, this absolute and merciful, ‘causality’” (p. 179). “Election is the fountain of all saving good, and out of it flow the fruits of faith, holiness, and other gifts, and finally also life eternal” (p.I80).

It might seem, on occasion, that Berkouwer is not willing to regard the fall and sin as embraced in the counsel of God. Some strange statements appear which might create this impression (cf. pp. 261, 268). But this would be a false inference. Numerous explicit remarks are to the contrary. “Nothing can be made independent of the counsel of God” (p. 201). It is with approval that he quotes Bavinck to the effect that “‘all of sinful reality, all of world history in the interrelations of its events, does not have its primary cause in itself—how would that be possible?—but beyond itself in the mind and will of God’” (p. 206; ct. pp. 202 f., 212, 215,217). Berkouwer’s formula is that of Augustine: contra voluntatem Dei but not praeter voluntatem Dei.

We must also be deeply appreciative of Berkouwer’s jealousy in this chapter, as also elsewhere, to avoid fatalistic determinism, on the one hand, and human autonomy, on the other. His discussion is constantly oriented against these fatal aberrations of human thought.

The question of pivotal interest is Berkouwer’s polemic against the parallelism or symmetry of election and reprobation. This question has sometimes been expressed in terms of the denial or affirmation of the equal ultimacy of election and reprobation. Against this tenet of equal ultimacy or, as he prefers to call it, the parallelism and symmetry of election and reprobation Berkouwer directs all his polemic resources. The term “equal ultimacy” in the formula could refer to the ultimacy as it concerns both God’s eternal counsel and man’s everlasting destiny. But it would appear that in the discussion the former aspect of ultimacy is particularly in view.

It should be recognized at the outset that the issue involved is not the particular terms sometimes used in the debate. The formulae arc not themselves sacrosanct. In fact the terms “reprobation” and “rejection” are not necessarily the most felicitous or the most biblically accurate to denote the aspect of God’s counsel with which the debate is concerned. The Scripture speaks of the determinate counsel of God and there should be no dispute on the biblical doctrine that sin and evil as well as good are embraced in this determinate counsel (cf. Luke 22:22; Acts 2:23; 4:27, 28; 17:26; Eph. 1:11). So it might be well to speak of God’s determinate purpose with respect to the non-elect. But in any case, there is predetermination on the part of God with respect to the damnation of those who finally perish. This “determinism” is real and must not be confused with fatalistic determinism. It is only at the peril of rejecting the witness of revelation that we shy away from the “determinism” of God’s determinate will. Of this Berkouwer is aware. He warns against an “indeterministic exegesis” of such passages as Romans 9:18, 22 (pp. 213, 215). Hence it is not enough to wave the red flag of “determinism”; it all depends on the kind of determinism we have in mind. The real issue in this instance is whether in the differentiation that exists among men the pure sovereignty of God’s good pleasure and predetermination must be posited in connection with what has been called preterition and reprobation as well as in connection with election. The affirmative would be that in the counsel of God sovereign differentiation is just as ultimate and real in “reprobation” as in election, understanding reprobation in the sense defined above. This is what the reviewer affirms and it appears to be what Dr. Bcrkouwer denies. It is this reviewer’s conviction that no other position than that affirmed can be elicited from such passages as Romans 9:10–24; 11:5–10, not to mention other evidence. And I am not persuaded that our author’s treatment of Romans 9 (pp. 210 ff.) takes adequate account of Paul’s teaching.

Berkouwer devotes much attention to what he regards as implied in parallelism or symmetry, namely, an identity of divine causality. “Election and rejection,” be says, “do not result from the one ‘causality’ as two parallels in the ways of belief and unbelief. They are not ‘equivalent-parallel‘ as is already shown in the fact that belief is from God, while unbelief is not” (p. 178; ct. pp. 194 f. and passim). In this connection appeal is made to the “Conclusion” of the Canons of Dort where it is denied that “in the same manner (eodem modo) in which the ejection is the fountain and cause of faith and good works, reprobation is the cause of unbelief and impiety” (ct. p. 175). To this pronouncement of Dort the fullest consent must be accorded. In what then does the dispute consist?

This question merits much fuller discussion than this review could reasonably allow. In the matter of distinction between election and what is denoted by “reprobation,” there is not only place but need for careful discrimination. When we deal with election we have to take into account not only the sovereign differentiation which it involves but also the effectuation of the purpose of grace which election contemplates. And when we deal with “reprobation” we have to take account not only of the sovereign differentiation which is involved but also of the distinct elements comprised in it and of the diverse factors which enter into the final result. There is diversity in the mode of divine operation. Election is the fountain and, in a certain sense, the cause of faith and its various concomitants. But when we deal with sin and unbelief, apart from which reprobation as damnation may never be conceived, we must not say that God is the author or cause of sin as he is of faith and its fruits. We cannot speak of an identity of divine causality. In the language of the Canons of Dort, ‘The cause or guilt (culpa) of this unbelief, as well as of all other sins, is nowise in God, but in man himself: whereas faith in Jesus Christ, and salvation through him is the free gift of God” (I, 5). Berkouwer’s sustained exposition and defence of this distinction must be endorsed (ct. pp. 176 fF. ) and it would be improper to speak of the “twofoldedness of the one divine causality” (pp. 194).

The necessary distinctions which must be observed, in respect of causality, between election unto life and all that is involved in it and flows from it, on the one hand, and “reprobation” unto death with all its factors and consequences, on the other, do not in the least interfere with the truth which is the real question at issue, to wit, the pure sovereignty of the differentiation inhering in the counsel of God’s will (boulee, theleema, eudokia). The “equal ultimacy” is here inviolate. God differentiated between men in his eternal decree; he made men to differ. And, ultimately, the only explanation of the differentiation is the sovereign will of God. The necessary differentiations in respect of causality in the diverse factors grounding and contributing to the wholly different destinies and outcomes must not be allowed to obscure or prejudice the sovereignty of the counsel of God’s will. As far as this aspect is concerned it makes no difference whether a supralapsarian or infralapsarian position is adopted. For, even on the latter premise, the sin of men is not the reason for the differentiation among men but simply and solely the sovereign will of God. Some of Berkouwer’s own statements would appear to carry this implication. But the more general thrust is, in the reviewer’s judgment, to the opposite effect.

We need not fear that this doctrine is any threat to the gospel of God’s grace which it is the glorious privilege of tho church to proclaim. It is on the crest of the wave of that sovereignty, exemplified in sovereign discrimination. that the full and free overtures of grace come to a lost world.

Since Berkouwer devotes so much space to the Re· formed Confessions, it is surprising that the Westminster Confession should receive such scant attention (cf. p. 22). None of the Reformed Confessions surpass chapter III of Westminster in finesse of formulation. Here is no imbalance. The caution given in section viii that “the doctrine of this high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care” follows the section dealing with the non-elect which in its import is surely identical with the position of Dort (cf. contra p. 181) enunciated some twenty-five years earlier but sets it forth with incomparable succinctness and precision.

JOHN MURRAY

Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia

*This review appeared originally in The Westminster Theological Journal of November 1960. We are thankful for the permission given us by the Editor to print this review in TORCH AND TRUMPET. Editorial Committee