A number of overtures will be brought to Synod 1995 to open all the offices of the church to women. I hope the delegates to Synod 1995 will carefully weigh the requirements of the Church Order as they consider these overtures. The requirements of the Church Order for revising (changing) previous decisions may easily get lost in all of the contentions and controversies surrounding last year’s decision.
Although I do not want these contentions to result in losing sight of the Church Order’s requirements, it may be helpful to very briefly examine the merits of two commonly heard objections to the 1994 decision.
That Controversial Little Word— “Clear” I think it is fair to assume that Synod 1994 meant exactly the same thing by the word “clear” that Report 31 and Synod 1993 meant by it. Both report 31 and Synod 1993 said, “There is no clear and unquestionable testimony of Scripture to compel the church to prohibit women in their equality in Christ from church office in all times, places, pun, WI. and circumstances.”1 In saying this, Synod 1993 was implying that only clear teaching of Scripture can compel people to act contrary to their own ideas of what is right.
Synod 1994 agreed with that implication, but disagreed on the question of whether such Scriptural teaching exists. Synod 1994 decided that there is indeed Scriptural teaching that legitimately compels people to act contrary to what they may otherwise think is right in this matter.2 Since Synod 1993 decided more than “apparent” Scriptural teaching to justify not changing Article 3, Synod 1994 was, in some sense, compelled to characterize such teaching as “clear.”3
I think people read far too much into this little word when they imagine that Synod 1994 meant to imply by it that a synodical decision is going to result in complete agreement on what Scripture teaches about women in office. That is obviously not the case. I think it is fair to assume that most (if not all) of the delegates to Synod 1993 and Synod 1994 had a firm grasp of this reality.
In spite of the obvious fact that disagreement about whether or not Scripture permits women in all the offices is sure to continue, Synod 1993 and 1994 agreed that whether or not Article 3 should be changed depends on whether or not Scripture permits women in all the offices. One synod answered the question of Scriptural teaching one way, the other synod answered it the opposite way.4 The mere fact that some people disagree with the answer of synod 1994 does not mean that Synod 1994 was working With an unreformed view of Scripture.
ARE THESE GROUNDS “UNREFORMED”?
The charge has been made repeatedly in the past year that the grounds for the 1994 decision are “unreformed”—that they give evidence of a “rationalist” or “fundamentalist” way of understanding Scripture. Such a charge is much easier to make than it is to substantiate. Unfortunately, some of the proponents of women in office too easily assume that anyone who understands the relevant Scripture passages differently than they do is reading Scripture with an unacceptable hermeneutic.
Most of our great grandparents would have thought that these grounds were so solid that they could hardly be debated. Does that mean that they were unreformed rationalists and fundamentalists? I think not.
It is just as unwarranted to assume that Synod 1994 had an “unreformed hermeneutic” when it decided not to change Church Order Article 3. In doing so, Synod 1994 merely adopted our grandparents’ understanding of certain Scripture passages. Furthermore, it did this as a basis for continuing to do what Reformed churches have traditionally done for centuries in respect to women in office.
DO FAULTY GROUNDS NECESSARILY REQUIRE A REVISED DECISION?
Without conceding that the 1994 grounds are seriously flawed, what would be the consequence if they were? Would that necessarily mean that the 1994 decision should not be allowed to stand?
There are many who seem to assume that the answer to that question is an unqualified “yes.” However, that answer is not supported by the Church Order. Article 29 is perfectly clear about the conditions which require the revision of a previous decision, and there is no mention of the adequacy of the decision’s grounds. Notice that Article 29 places the burden of proof upon those who wish to clarify the decision. Notice also that exact nature of the proof required is very clearly spelled out.
Article 29
Decisions of ecclesiastical assemblies shall be reached only upon due consideration. The decisions of the assemblies shall be considered settled and binding, unless it is proved that they conflict with the Word of God or the Church Order.
Article 29 requires that the decision be proved contrary to the Word of God or the Church Order. Disagreement with the grounds for a decision is different from proof that the decision itself conflicts with the Word of God. It is important to distinguish between the decision and its grounds, and to recognize that the grounds do not have the same binding status as the decision.
This is rather easy to illustrate by looking at some things that happened at last year’s synod. The morning after the decision not to ratify the change in Article 3, many of the delegates who were strongly in favor of women in office feared that they would not be allowed to understand the relevant texts differently than synod did when it made its decision. The resulting discussion on the floor of synod is recorded in Article 83 of the Acts of Synod.
A series of procedural questions and motions seeks clarification on the meaning and legitimacy of certain elements in the previous day’s synodical actions.
The president of synod declares that no synodical delegate or officebearer is disallowed from serving in his office because he interprets Scripture texts differently than synod did in using these texts as a basis for its decision on Church Order Article 3.5
As this record indicates, synod interpreted certain Scripture texts “as its basis for its decision on Church Order Article 3.” The delegates could not make their decision without considering and interpreting relevant Scriptural teaching. The prevailing interpretation is recorded in the grounds.
This declaration by the president of synod implies that the grounds for the decision have a different status than the decision itself. It is important to notice that synod’s interpretations ofScripture (i.e. the grounds) are not binding in the same way that the decision itself is.
Article 29 requires that the decision (not the grounds) either be accepted as “settled and binding,” or proved contrary to the Word of God or the Church Order. I hope that the delegates to Synod 1995 will clearly distinguish between personal indignation at the grounds for the 1994 decision, arid substantive Biblical arguments against the decision itself.
NOT ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY SCRIPTURE OR CONTRARY TO SCRIPTURE
Classis Grand Rapids East is sending an overture that argues that Synod 1994 did not adequately support its decision with Scripture.6 It is important to distinguish between the contention that synod did not adequately support its decision with Scripture, and the contention that Scripture militates against the decision. Article 29 requires the latter. It requires more than proving that Scripture is not a close enough friend of the decision. It requires that those who seek to change the decision prove that Scripture is the enemy of the decision.
Because of the requirements of Article 29, Synod 1995 cannot legally revise the 1994 decision unless it is proved that not changing Church Order Article 3 “is contrary to the Word of God or the Church Order.” The only way a decision not to change the Church Order can be “contrary to the Word of God” is if the Word of God requires that it be changed. If there is no compelling Biblical case that Church Order Article 3 must be changed (or if there is no evidence that the decision was made in violation of the Church Order), Article 29 requires that the decision be considered “settled and binding.”
In addition to Article 29, I hope that the delegates also seriously consider the requirements of Article 31.
Article 31
A request for revision of a decision shall be submitted to the assembly which made the decision. Such a request shall be honored only if sufficient and new grounds for reconsideration are presented.
There has been a great deal of controversy over the correct understanding and application of Article 31. In the past few years quite a few overtures have been brought to synod, charging that the Synods of 1990 and 1993 violated this article.
Synod 1994 said that the Synod of 1993 violated Article 31 when it revised the 1992 decision.7 However, Dr. Henry De Moor, the seminary’s Professor of Church Polity,spoke to the Synod of 1993 during its deliberations and led the delegates to believe that synod would not be acting contrary to Article 31 if it revised the 1992 decision. So we now have a Church Order article which is interpreted and applied in contradictory ways by synod and by our Professor of Church Polity.
Last year Classis Minnesota South brought an overture asking synod to “clarify” Article 31.8 I was on the advisory committee that dealt with the matter. We recommended that synod not accede to the overture, largely on the advice of our faculty advisor (who had been in close contact with Dr. De Moor). He assured us that Article 31 is sufficiently clear in its present form. Synod 1994 decided not to modify Article 31, one of its grounds being, “The overture does not demonstrate that Articles 29 and 31 are sufficiently ambiguous to warrant additional clarification.”9
I hope my explanation of Article 31 does not muddy these clear waters.
Notice that Article 31 speaks of two different things “revision” and “reconsideration.” Before the decision of any synod can be revised by a following synod, that following synod must first decide to reconsider it. In other words, before Synod 1995 can change the 1994 decision, it must first decide to open up the question to be discussed again. After synod decides to reconsider the decision, synod then takes up the next and separate matter of whether or not to change it. This is exactly the procedure that Synod 1993 used when it decided to revise the 1992 decision.10
Article 31 requires that synod honor a request for revision only if “sufficient and new grounds for reconsideration are presented.” This is a restriction on the first question that Synod 1995 will face. It may decide to “reconsider” the 1994 decision (open up the decision for discussion and possible change) only if “sufficient and new” grounds are presented.
When are grounds for reconsideration “sufficient and new”? Although different answers have been given to that question in recent years, Synod 1994 (as we have seen) decided that the phrase does not need to be clarified with an official definition.
Nonetheless, applying this rule requires that we have some working definition of this phrase. I think that the meaning of the phrase is indeed rather obvious. New means “previously unconsidered.” Sufficient means “of such a nature as to call into question whether or not the decision is contrary to the Word of God or the Church Order.”
Article 31 is saying, in effect, that synod may not reconsider the decisions of previous synods unless there is reason to believe 1) that the assembly which made the decision failed to consider something relevant; and 2) there is a substantial possibility that considering the matter again in the light of these new considerations may reveal that the decision is in conflict with the Word of God or the Church Order, and so result in change. The first condition is another way of saying that the ground for reconsideration is “new.” The second condition is another way of saying that the ground for reconsideration is “sufficient.” Both conditions are important. If there is no real likelihood that the decision will not be proved to be in conflict with the Word of God or the Church Order, then why waste time and energy reconsidering it? After all, Article 29 requires that it be “considered settled and binding” unless it is in conflict with the Word of God or the Church Order.
Furthermore, if a previous synod already considered a whole set of issues, and decided on the basis of these considerations that the decision was not in conflict with the Word of God or the Church Order, then why believe that a different synod, considering the same issues, would decide that the decision is in conflict with the Word of God or the Church Order?
Of course, one might possibly hope that, at this synod a sufficient number of delegates will see the issue in the “right way.” Unfortunately, in that case nothing would ever be “settled and binding.” If those who disagreed with a decision could forever require the assembly to consider the same thing over and over again, no doubt they would do so until the assembly decided the issue according to their liking. Furthermore, those who has agreed with the first decision could then ask for the revised decision to be reconsidered, in the hope that, this time around, the re-revised decision would be to their liking.
Article 31 is intended to give a certain flexibility—a flexibility that comes from the recognition that human assemblies are fallible, that they may consequently “miss something” as they make a decision; and furthermore that in doing so they might decide something in a way which is contrary to God’s Word or the Church Order. In such a case, the decision can be changed.
Article 31 is also intended to give a certain stability—a stability that comes from recognizing that the assemblies made their decisions with the “due consideration” required by Article 29; and, consequently (unless their consideration was so incomplete that they may have inadvertently violated God’s Word or the Church Order) the decision stands.
IS IT “NEW”?
This means, for example, that an overture that argues on the basis of conscience to revise the decision of Synod 1994 may not.be honored unless it is substantively different from conscience-based arguments that have been considered previously. There were three overtures before Synod 1994 (Overtures 22–24)11 that asked that Church Order Article 3 be changed. All three appealed to conscience. Overture 22, in ground “6,” states: “Congregations that feel conscience bound to ordain women to the offices and to remain loyal to denominational decisions will be placed in an untenable position by another delay.”
Overture 23, in ground “B,” states: “Where Christians conscientiously and in good faith disagree and the matter cannot be settled definitively by Scripture or Christian principle, freedom must be allowed.” Overture 24, in ground “4,” states: “To delay ratification of this change further may well bind the consciences of members and churches for whom opening all the offices to women presents a positive contribution to their faith and life.”
Synod 1994 declared that the decision not to ratify the proposed change in Church Order Article 3 is its answer to Overtures 21–24.12 This declaration implies that synod had considered the question of conscience as it was raised by these three overtures; and, in spite of such considerations, decided not to ratify the change in Article 3.
There are overtures coming to synod this year that argue that conscience is a reason to change Church Order Article 3. Their arguments mayor may not be substantively different than arguments that have been considered previously. If they are not substantively different, then they are not new, and Article 31 requires that a request for revision based on them shall not be honored. The matter should not even be opened up for discussion on the floor of synod until new considerations are presented.
Any grounds for reconsideration which are substantively the same as previously presented arguments are not “sufficient and new.” Thus, the following assertion (among others) would not be acceptable to justify reconsideration of the 1994 decision:
Study of this issue for almost a quarter century has shown that, while Reformed Christians can and do disagree about some texts, nothing in Scripture definitively excludes women from any of the ecclesiastical offices (Overture 23, Ground “A”)!3
Synod already considered the fact that sincere Christians disagree about certain relevant texts and was not persuaded by this consideration to draw the conclusion that “nothing in Scripture definitively excludes women from any of the ecclesiastical offices.” Synod concluded that Scripture does in fact forbid what many think it doesn’t forbid, and on that basis decided not to ratify the change in Article 3. This ground has been considered and rejected. Thus, future grounds that are substantively the same as this one are not new.
IS IT “SUFFICIENT”?
So far we have applied only one of the required preconditions for reconsideration, and there are two. The second condition is that the ground for reconsideration must be sufficient. The following ground not only fails the test of being new (since it was presented last year), it also fails the test of being sufficient.
To delay ratification of this change further may well increase confusion and disunity in the church (Overture 24, Ground “3”).14
The operative definition of “sufficient” in Article 31 is (as I have offered it), “of such a nature as to call into question whether or not the decision is contrary to the Word of God or the Church Order.” Speculation about what mayor may not cause confusion and disunity in the church does not, in and of itself, call into question whether a particular decision is contrary to God’s Word or the Church Order.
Evaluating the potential for confusion and disunity in the church is a matter of judgment. In the judgment of Synod 1994, the best way to avoid confusion and disunity in tile church was to make the decision it did.
Of course, “second-guessing” synod’s judgment is a very common thing in the life of the church, and sometimes necessary. However, the only “second-guessing” that synod may honor with a reconsideration of its decision is the “second guessing” which calls into question whether or not synod’s decision is contrary to the Word of God or the Church Order. That is what Article 31 means when it requires that the grounds for reconsideration be “sufficient.”
In summary, Article 31 requires the delegates to Synod 1995 to ask themselves two questions: (1) Does this request for revision contain grounds that synod has not considered before? (2) Does this request for revision contain grounds that raise the possibility that synod may have acted contrary to the Word of God or the Church Order when it decided not to ratify the change in Article 3? Reconsideration and revision of the 1994 decision is in accord with Article 31 only if the answer to both questions is “yes.”
FOLLOWING THE CHURCH ORDER IS GOOD FOR THE CHURCH
Obviously, not everyone thinks that the 1994 decision is a good decision. But if lack of unanimous agreement means a decision should be called into question, then practically every decision an assembly makes is suspect!
This long conflict will never end if we keep making the same arguments over and over again (which is what Article 31 forbids). No conflict will ever be resolved if everyone insists that the matter is never finally decided until they have prevailed (which is what Article 29 forbids). Although no decision is beyond correction, the decisions of the assemblies are required to stand unless and until they are corrected according to the provisions of the Church Order.
These two Church Order articles are designed to protect the primary authority of God’s Word in the life of the church, as well as the secondary authority of the church’s assemblies. The church will not fare very well if either of these authorities are broken down through careless disregard of the rules that are designed to protect them. Running roughshod over the Church Order is not likely to result in order in the church.
FOOTNOTES
1. 1993 Acts of Synod, p. 596.
2. See Ground “g,” 1994 Acts of Synod, p.516.
3. See Ground “b,” 1994 Acts of Synod, p.514.
4. It must be noted here that Synod 1993 made a provisional decision to change the Church Order—one that required ratification by the following synod. Synod 1994 made a decision which does not need to be ratified by a following synod. Synod 1994 closed the question that Synod 1993 opened.
5. 1994 Acts of Synod, p. 517.
6. It seems that during the past year, Classis Grand Rapids East has adopted a higher standard than it had previously for what amounts to adequate Scriptural support for a Church Order decision. In its overture to Synod 1994 (cf.1994 Agenda, p. 282), Classis Grand Rapids East asked synod to ratify the 1993 decision to change Article 3. Classis declared in its first ground, “Biblical grounds for this decision have been provided for synod and have been adopted by synod” (Acts of Synod 1993, p. 596). It is helpful to actually go back and see what Synod 1993 did when it adopted its “Biblical grounds.” Synod 1993 opened the offices to women and declared, “This action is permitted by Scripture.” Then it tells us to see Report 31 and two other past study reports, and quotes the summary conclusions of Report 31. The synods who first considered these three study reports were not persuaded by them to open all the offices of the church to women. Synod 1993 seems to assume that if we actually went back and looked at these reports today, we would draw different conclusions from them than did the synods who first considered them. Why we would do that, or why we should do it, the Synod of 1993 does not explain. We are just supposed to take synod’s word for it. If that method of Scripturally supporting a decision about the Church Order was acceptable to Classis Grand Rapids East following the Synod of 1993, then it is obvious that Classis Grand Rapids East is now applying quite a different standard to Synod 1994.
7. See Ground “e”, 1994 Acts of Synod, p. 515.
8. 1994 Agenda, pp. 240–241.
9. 1994 Acts of Synod, p. 487.
10. 1993 Acts of Synod, p. 595-598.
11. 1994 Agenda, pp. 282–285.
12. 1994 Acts of Synod, p.518.
13. 1994 Agenda, p. 284.
14. 1994 Agenda, p. 284.